Remembering Goh Keng Swee - A holy order to scale new heights

May 18, 2010 / Tues (with thanks to Straits Times )
REMEMBERING GOH KENG SWEE
A holy order to scale new heights

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong had to pause and collect himself last Saturday when he recalled a speech that Dr Goh Keng Swee made on Sept 25, 1984 - his last major speech before retiring from politics. Mr Lee first heard the speech as a political rookie, along with other newcomers. Here is an excerpt from the famous 'holy order' address that Dr Goh delivered to members of the establishment.

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MORE than 30 years ago, a group of returned students looked at colonial Singapore and decided they had a mission to change the system. They then applied the lessons they learnt in British universities, set about building up a trade union following and, in 1954, formed the People's Action Party (PAP). It was an act of reckless folly. Mercifully for them and for Singapore, they did not receive the punishment they richly deserved.

If I were a deeply religious man, I would ascribe our escape to a benevolent God. As it is, I will leave the verdict to a future historian. You may ask: 'Why was our entry into politics reckless?' The answer is that we totally misread the situation, as indeed did many others. We did not understand that the mass base was firmly in the grip of the communists, ably led by the underground Singapore Town Committee of the Malayan Communist Party.

The People's Action Party was immediately captured by the Town Committee and we were their prisoners. We were like innocent virgins roaming a brothel area. Misfortune could hardly be avoided. Such were the modest - if that is the right word - beginnings of the PAP. I will not tell you of the nine-year struggle waged between the communists and us.

A long searing fight of this kind must leave its imprint on the contestants, both on their individual characters and the political institutions they operate. I want to tell you something about this and you will understand better why we are what we are and govern Singapore the way we do.

A person who has had a narrow escape with his life soon sees merit in the habit of prudence. This is exactly what happened to us. (Niccolo) Machiavelli said: 'Men are fond of innovations, and liking the first taste, fail to see the poison within.' Having failed at the beginning of our political career to see the poison within, we are always on the lookout for poison in new situations.

Prudence does not mean that one must always take counsel of one's fears. In the course of our political struggles of the first decade, we learnt that in a desperate situation timidity leads to disaster. Safety can be won only by daring.

We also learnt that experience is a harsh taskmaster. Deciding on policy and determining a line of action is different from engaging in a debate. Cabinet government is not a debating society or an academic seminar.

These are intellectual exercises. Views are aired and if done with style and elegance, the participants go home happy. In government, you have to live with the consequences of your decision. If you make a mistake, the results are painful. In political life, there is no alibi for failure.

Dealing with real issues in this way can be a humbling experience. One result is the circumspection with which we hold an opinion on a given issue. The serene confidence with which Western journalists and liberal academics prescribe solutions to our problems is a source of constant wonder to us.

Experience in the first traumatic decade and the happier years after that has determined the style of work of the old guard. Some aspects are generally known, others are not. I will describe three main features.

First, in our perspective, long-term benefits take precedence over short-term costs. We are willing to take unpopular steps if the long-term advantages to Singapore justify the policy. We can do this for two reasons: first, our track record; second, the ability of the Prime Minister (Lee Kuan Yew) to carry the public on difficult and unpopular issues.

When faced with a nasty problem, we meet it head on. Experience shows that difficulties cannot be wished away. Postponing action in the hope that time solves everything usually makes your predicament worse.

The third feature of the old guard is that we work as a close-knit team. This is not surprising as otherwise we could have hardly survived our early travails. We were also lucky to have as our skipper a man of outstanding qualities. I recall several occasions when all seemed lost. There appeared to be no answer to the terrifying dominance of the communist open front organisations in full cry. Yet he will come out with some devilish strategem to spring upon the enemy and confound them.

I have described the traits of the old guard not out of nostalgia but because we are now in the process of handing the torch to the new guard. Not all the old guard are happy at the way it is being done. Some say we should allow leaders to emerge from in-fighting at the grassroots. I don't see how this can be done when, under the party Constitution, the party branches are deprived of any power to control the central executive.

I want to say something about the new guard, not by way of advice but to draw attention to some basic differences between their situation and the old guard's. From this, it will follow that they cannot follow the style of work of the old guard. They will have to find their own way.
While we have established our authority to govern, they have to win their spurs. They can do this in two ways. First, if Singapore enjoys a long period of tranquillity in the years to come, they will win public respect and confidence by the way they manage their ministries, explain policies to the public, handle debates in Parliament and deal with constituency affairs. Singapore is a small place and the public well-informed.

The second way will provide the real test of their mettle. This will happen if the Republic runs into a major crisis. I naturally hope that this will not happen. The young guard have no experience of handling crisis situations and hence their ability in crisis management remains untested. I think we have put together a good team, people with good minds, sober habits and upright character.

The nature of the electorate is changing. With the passage of time, the generation of the old guard will disappear with the old guard. A new generation is emerging. This generation has never experienced hardship. Some of my colleagues, when making this statement, seem to imply that the new generation has thereby committed some gross misdemeanour. Of course this is not true.

Since they have not gone through hard times, as the old generation had, their response to government policies will be different. Indeed their expectations of life must be different. Their willingness to accept present sacrifice for future benefit will not be the same as that of the old generation. These are the facts of life and it is no use bewailing them.

The upshot of all this is that the style of government must change and probably, to a significant degree, the substance of policy as well. But the ends of policy are immutable. They are, first, to achieve prosperity for the Republic and her citizens, and second, to ensure the survival of the Republic as an independent sovereign state.

Achieving prosperity is a matter of generating good rates of economic growth. We have been spectacularly successful in the past two decades and barring a major calamity, we should get by in the years ahead. I will therefore not discuss this subject. On the other hand, people are less well-informed about the survival of the Republic as an independent sovereign state. As a result, people take our existence as an independent state for granted even though they know that there is no natural law of the universe which lays down that this must be so till the end of time.

In weighing the odds of peace and war, we must go beyond the foreseeable future into the indefinite future. The history of mankind shows that man's capacity to inflict injury upon himself seems to be boundless. Edward Gibbon in his Decline And Fall Of The Roman Empire gave this definition of history. 'History,' he said, 'is little more than a register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind.'

National service imposes not only a great sacrifice of time and money on the young men called up. It is also unpleasant as military training aims to push the soldier to the limits of human endurance. Yet in every election since national service was introduced, its abolition has never been an election issue. Opposition parties may be deficient in many ways, but they understand that calling for the abolition of national service will not gain them votes. The average Singapore citizen knows the dangers that he faces are real and not hypothetical. A kind of folk wisdom has grown on the need to defend ourselves.

What are the implications of this to the establishment? First, we must never lower our guard. This means keeping the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) at as high a level of efficiency as 6 per cent of our gross national product (GNP) will allow. It also means channelling sufficient high quality manpower for defence purposes.

The second requirement is a more subtle and less tangible one. If we regard the SAF as the hardware of deterrence, we also need to complement this with appropriate software. I am not thinking of tactical and strategic skills at higher SAF command and staff. I am thinking of the attitude of the civilian population, more critically that of members of the establishment.
The crucial element here is their character - that is, their nerve and resolve in a crisis - and their understanding of what is at stake. We must never forget that our existence as an independent sovereign state cannot be made to depend on the sufferance of others. The most dependable guarantee of our independence is a strong SAF. A strong SAF, in turn, depends on the political will to make the effort and pay the price.

Having said this, while we must prepare for war to keep the peace, we must not get paranoid about this. The worst policy is to arm ourselves to the point where our neighbours misread our intentions. We are not Israel and South-east Asia is not the Middle East.

Ours is in a unique political situation. In other democracies what we are doing is unnecessary, in fact, unthinkable. The opposition parties stand ready as alternative governments. This cannot be said of our opposition parties. Where countries are governed by military juntas, the generals in charge keep a close watch on other generals, even colonels, not to groom them for leadership but to forestall a coup d'etat.

It seems right that we are preparing for the largest replacement exercise of MPs and ministers at the next general election.

To the old guard who are stepping down, may I say: 'Thank you for your contribution. It has been greater than you imagine. You will be leaving in good company. I will be with you.'

To the new guard soon joining us, may I say: 'Welcome to you. Some of you will discover before long that you have joined a holy order that expects total commitment from you. That will be your moment of truth. You will then regard the present condition of the Republic not as a pinnacle of achievement but as a base from which to scale new heights.'
The style of government must change and probably, to a significant degree, the substance of policy as well. But the ends of policy are immutable. They are, first, to achieve prosperity for the Republic and her citizens, and second, to ensure the survival of the Republic as an independent sovereign state.